Boolos on the justification of set theory

Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):30-53 (2007)
George Boolos has argued that the iterative conception of set justifies most, but not all, the ZFC axioms, and that a second conception of set, the Frege-von Neumann conception (FN), justifies the remaining axioms. This article challenges Boolos's claim that FN does better than the iterative conception at justifying the axioms in question. For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Alex Oliver, Mary Leng, Michael Potter, Øystein Linnebo, Paul Benacerraf, Peter Smith, and three journal referees.
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