Philosophy Research Archives 14:395-403 (1988)
In Sameness and Substance David Wiggins bas indicated difficulties with individuating objects. By confining attention to material objects, I show how spatio-temporal features will do the job for them. I construct the explanation by examining how we coordinate sensations of several senses to produce an apprehension of the three spatial dimensions. I also search out grounds for distinguishing between apprehensions of objects and apprehension of the space in which they reside. Several necessary truths that apply are also distinguished from each other, and from the basic process, which is not itself necessary
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DOI 10.5840/pra1988/19891415
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