David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480 (1995)
In his book Ethics J. L. Mackie says that moral facts would have to be queer facts. I argue that an act’s hurting somebody is necessarily a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, not to do that act; and that such hurting is a natural fact, not a queer fact. I try to defend this externalist position about this particular reason against internalists such as Mackie, and in particular against the position of Stephen Darwall in Impartial Reason
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joseph Millum (2008). A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
Eve Garrard & David McNaughton (1998). Mapping Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.
Simon Blackburn (1995). Practical Tortoise Raising. Mind 104 (416):695-711.
Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
Jenny Teichman (2003). Good for and Good About. Philosophy 78 (1):115-121.
Pauline Kleingeld (2010). Moral Consciousness and the 'Fact of Reason'. In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Pink (2007). Normativity and Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.
Kristen Irwin (2011). Amyraut on Reason and Religious Belief. Modern Schoolman 88 (3-4):191-200.
Bryan Lueck (2009). Kant's Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity. Inquiry 52 (6):596 – 608.
Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469 - 484.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads5 ( #229,521 of 1,102,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #296,833 of 1,102,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?