David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):269-279 (2002)
In his paper "Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano," Matjaz Potrc endeavors to provide a Brentanian analysis of how it is possible for phenomenal objects to become the contents of intentional acts of sensing. Potrc contends that while Brentano stands as an "origins philosopher" at the crossroads of analytic and continental philosophy, subsequent philosophers from both traditions have failed to adequately address the nature of phenomenological experiences. Potrc seeks to redress the explanatory insufficiency. This commentary outlines Brentano's theory of sensation as background to Potrc's important project and evaluates and develops his thesis of Brentano as an "origins philosopher."
|Keywords||Analytic Intentionality Phenomenology Philosophy Brentano Potrc, M|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Linda L. McAlister (ed.) (1977). The Philosophy of Brentano. Humanities Press.
Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--20.
Matjaž Potrč (2002). Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):231-267.
Edmund Runggaldier (1989). On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of “Intentionality” in Brentano. Topoi 8 (2):97-103.
Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
Philip J. Bartok (2005). Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):437-460.
Dale Jacquette (ed.) (2004). The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press.
Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #134,768 of 1,098,400 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #113,246 of 1,098,400 )
How can I increase my downloads?