Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):269-279 (2002)
|Abstract||In his paper "Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano," Matjaz Potrc endeavors to provide a Brentanian analysis of how it is possible for phenomenal objects to become the contents of intentional acts of sensing. Potrc contends that while Brentano stands as an "origins philosopher" at the crossroads of analytic and continental philosophy, subsequent philosophers from both traditions have failed to adequately address the nature of phenomenological experiences. Potrc seeks to redress the explanatory insufficiency. This commentary outlines Brentano's theory of sensation as background to Potrc's important project and evaluates and develops his thesis of Brentano as an "origins philosopher."|
|Keywords||Analytic Intentionality Phenomenology Philosophy Brentano Potrc, M|
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