David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analyse and Kritik 33 (1):87-92 (2011)
In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Raimo Tuomela (2006). Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
Raimo Tuomela (1991). Intentional Single and Joint Action. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):235 - 262.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2012). Joint Action and Development. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (246):23-47.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Joint Attention in Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Raimo Tuomela (2000). Collective and Joint Intention. Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Raimo Tuomela (1996). Philosophy and Distributed Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Joint Intention. In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley.
Celia Brownell (2011). Early Developments in Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
Marion Godman (2013). Why We Do Things Together: The Social Motivation for Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603.
Raimo Tuomela (1990). What Are Goals and Joint Goals? Theory and Decision 28 (1):1-20.
Added to index2011-11-29
Total downloads7 ( #185,040 of 1,100,746 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #289,565 of 1,100,746 )
How can I increase my downloads?