Comment on Raimo Tuomela. Joint Action: How Rational? How Irreducible?
Analyse and Kritik 33 (1):87-92 (2011)
| Abstract | In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Raimo Tuomela (2006). Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
Raimo Tuomela (1991). Intentional Single and Joint Action. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):235 - 262.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2011). Joint Action and Development. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):n/a-n/a.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher (forthcoming). Joint Attention in Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Raimo Tuomela (2000). Collective and Joint Intention. Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Raimo Tuomela (1996). Philosophy and Distributed Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Joint Intention. In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley.
Celia Brownell (2011). Early Developments in Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
Marion Godman (forthcoming). Why We Do Things Together: The Social Motivation for Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
Raimo Tuomela (1990). What Are Goals and Joint Goals? Theory and Decision 28 (1):1-20.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-11-29Total downloads4 ( #178,585 of 549,067 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,067 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
