David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294 (2005)
Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the metalanguage in which we develop an account of meaning. The former view is compatible with the truth-conditional theory of meaning for the object language, the latter is incompatible with it. However, the former view is also trivially true; hence we should endorse the claim that any form of deflationism worth being interested in is incompatible with understanding meaning truth-conditionally.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Panu Raatikainen (2008). On Rules of Inference and the Meanings of Logical Constants. Analysis 68 (300):282-287.
Paul Horwich (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
Lionel Shapiro (2008). Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
Kari Middleton (2007). The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
John Collins (2002). Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536.
Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007). The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 61--89.
Huw Price (1997). What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning? Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.
Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads66 ( #17,771 of 1,010,916 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #22,161 of 1,010,916 )
How can I increase my downloads?