Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox

It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are "inconsistent" provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a few objections are entertained
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/40380471
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Scharp (2007). Replacing Truth. Inquiry 50 (6):606 – 621.
Colin Johnston (2014). Conflicting Rules and Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):410-433.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

67 ( #48,510 of 1,725,237 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,379 of 1,725,237 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.