On the determination argument against deflationism
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):243–250 (2007)
| Abstract | (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2007) > Another look at Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan’s criticism of deflationism. I claim that their argument turns on a simple confusion about definitions and thereby fails to establish that deflationism somehow requires meaning to be explained in terms of truth conditions. | |||||||||
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