David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (3):281-289 (2009)
The Marburg neo-Kantians argue that Hermann von Helmholtz's empiricist account of the a priori does not account for certain knowledge, since it is based on a psychological phenomenon, trust in the regularities of nature. They argue that Helmholtz's account raises the 'problem of validity' (Gueltigkeitsproblem): how to establish a warranted claim that observed regularities are based on actual relations. I reconstruct Heinrich Hertz's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Bild theoretic answer to the problem of validity: that scientists and philosophers can depict the necessary a priori constraints on states of affairs in a given system, and can establish whether these relations are actual relations in nature. The analysis of necessity within a system is a lasting contribution of the Bild theory. However, Hertz and Wittgenstein argue that the logical and mathematical sentences of a Bild are rules, tools for constructing relations, and the rules themselves are meaningless outside the theory. Carnap revises the argument for validity by attempting to give semantic rules for translation between frameworks. Russell and Quine object that pragmatics better accounts for the role of a priori reasoning in translating between frameworks. The conclusion of the tale, then, is a partial vindication of Helmholtz's original account.
|Keywords||model models modeling a priori regularity Helmholtz Russell Quine|
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References found in this work BETA
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922/1999). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dover Publications.
Ruth G. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 281--297.
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Larry Laudan (2002). A Confutation of Convergent Realism. In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 211.
Rudolf Carnap (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (2):20--40.
Citations of this work BETA
Alisa Bokulich (2015). Maxwell, Helmholtz, and the Unreasonable Effectiveness of the Method of Physical Analogy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 50:28-37.
Liesbet De Kock (2016). Helmholtz's Kant Revisited . The All-Pervasive Nature of Helmholtz's Struggle with Kant's Anschauung. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:20-32.
Alisa Bokulich (2014). Bohr and Wittgenstein on Language and Reality. Metascience 23 (1):79-82.
Rinat M. Nugayev (2015). Communicative Rationality of the Maxwellian Revolution. Foundations of Science 20 (4):447-478.
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