An argument against Fregean that-clause semantics

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347 (2008)
I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.
Keywords Frege  Belief reports  Quantification
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References found in this work BETA
Graeme Forbes (1990). The Indispensability of Sinn. Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
Paul Horwich (2001). A Defense of Minimalism. Synthese 126 (1-2):149 - 165.
David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Hicks (2010). A Note on Pretense and Co-Reference. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400.
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