David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the Entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the Entanglement urn have ontologically different properties form normal ones. In this context, considering a Monday-waking (drawing a red ball) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability. This leads to a two-sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem. On the one hand, the first situation is handled by the argument for 1/3. On the other hand, the second situation corresponds to a reasoning that echoes the argument for 1/2 but that leads however, to different conclusions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joel Pust (2011). Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference. Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
Joel Pust (2008). Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447.
Daniel Peterson (2011). Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis's Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. Synthese 181 (3):367-374.
Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre (2010). Sleeping Beauty Meets Monday. Synthese 174 (3):397 - 412.
Patrick Hawley (2013). Inertia, Optimism and Beauty. Noûs 47 (1):85-103.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #109,306 of 1,781,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #35,941 of 1,781,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?