David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564 (2006)
Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can accommodate colour structure by explaining it in terms of colour experience. I argue that this response fails. Along the way, I examine other interesting issues in the philosophy of colour and colour perception, for instance the relational structure of colour experience and the description theory of how colour names refer.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1999). Back to the Theory of Appearing. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford University Press.
Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1991). Physicalist Theories of Color. Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
Citations of this work BETA
Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
Jonathan Cohen (2012). Redder and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):313-326.
Similar books and articles
Mohan Matthen (2009). Truly Blue: An Adverbial Aspect of Perceptual Representation. Analysis 69 (1):48-54.
Tine Wilde (2002). The 4th Dimension. Wittgenstein on Colour and Imagination. In Christian Kanzian, Josef Quitterer & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach. Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. 284-286.
Bernard Harrison (1967). On Describing Colors. Inquiry 10 (1-4):38-52.
Glyn W. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch (1999). Disorder of Colour Consciousness: The View From Neuropsychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):956-957.
Yasmina Jraissati, Elley Wakui, Lieven Decock & Igor Douven (2012). Constraints on Colour Category Formation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):171-196.
John Morrison (2012). Colour in a Physical World: A Problem Due to Visual Noise. Mind 121 (482):333-373.
V. Arstila (2003). True Colors, False Theories. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):41-61.
John Campbell (2006). Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. 31--48.
Jonathan Ellis (2005). Colour Irrealism and the Formation of Colour Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #29,313 of 1,413,298 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #30,334 of 1,413,298 )
How can I increase my downloads?