David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367 (2010)
Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
|Keywords||consciousness pain phenomenal intentionality|
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References found in this work BETA
Murat Aydede (ed.) (2005). Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.
Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819 - 839.
Review author[S.]: Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
Citations of this work BETA
Adam Pautz (2011). Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World? Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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