Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):129-152 (2006)
|Abstract||According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way to detect themanot only in scientific experiments, but also from the first-person perspective. Since neither third- nor first- person evidence can rule out the actual occurrence of such dissociations, the alleged nomological connection between phenomenal and physical properties cannot be established, in principle. As a consequence, the distinction between logical and nomological possibility breaks down and it cannot be ruled out that such dissociations occur in an unlimited number of cases.|
|Keywords||Cause Epistemology Event Experience First Person Properties Psychophysicalism Qualia Zombie|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Timm Triplett (2006). Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions. Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
Gabriel M. A. Segal (2009). The Causal Inefficacy of Content. Mind and Language 24 (1):80-102.
Torin Alter (web). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press.
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #16,964 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?