Fictional coreference as a problem for the pretense theory

Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156 (2008)
There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
Keywords Empty names  Fictional coreference  Pretense
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David Kaplan (1990). Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:93 - 119.

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