David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346 (2012)
How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran’s Authorship view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed primarily with the attitude of belief in mind, is found wanting when applied to intention. An alternative account is proposed for knowledge of one’s own intentions that gives a central role to the mental act of deciding what to do. It is argued that we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action.
|Keywords||Self-knowledge Intention Belief Transparency|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oup Oxford.
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Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2013). Understanding Conative Phenomenology: Lessons From Ricœur. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):537-557.
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