Intentionalism and perceptual presence

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541 (2007)
H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x
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David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.

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Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.

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