David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541 (2007)
H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
Similar books and articles
Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Bernhard Nickel (2006). Against Intentionalism. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Introduction: Perceptual Experience. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 1--30.
Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
Thomas Raleigh (2011). Visual Experience & Demonstrative Thought. Disputatio 4 (30):69-91.
Jeff Speaks (2010). Attention and Intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads176 ( #4,971 of 1,410,271 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #22,719 of 1,410,271 )
How can I increase my downloads?