In defense of global supervenience

Abstract
Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and in general that global supervenience is too weak to be an interesting dependence relation. We argue that these arguments are unsound. Along the way, we clarify the relationship between global and strong supervenience, and show clearly what sort of dependence global supervenience provides
Keywords Dependency  Metaphysics  Property  Supervenience
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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Zed Adams (2011). Moral Mistakes. Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):1-21.
Karen Bennett (2004). Global Supervenience and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
Mark Moyer (2008). Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.

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