Is there an empirical answer to the explanatory gap argument?
Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):202-205 (1998)
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Mark T. Nelson (1998). Bertrand Russell's Defence of the Cosmological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):87-100.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404 - 418.
Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
M. Scheele (2002). Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.
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