A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics

Recent work in philosophy could benefit from paying greater attention to empirical results from cognitive science involving judgments about the nature of our ordinary experience. This paper describes the way that experimental and theoretical results about the nature of ordinary judgments could—and should—inform certain sorts of enquiries in contemporary philosophy, using metaphysics as an exemplar, and hence defines a new way for experimental philosophy and cognitive science to contribute to traditional philosophical debates
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Developmental Psychology   Epistemology   Neurosciences   Cognitive Psychology   Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0034-z
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
L. A. Paul (2010). Temporal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
David Lewis (2004). Void and Object. In John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press 277-290.
Ned Markosian (2008). Restricted Composition. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub. 341--63.

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