David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (2005)
What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory? These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy.
|Keywords||Self (Philosophy Identity (Psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$24.08 used (52% off) $27.98 new (41% off) $43.21 direct from Amazon (14% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD438.5.P48 2005|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mikel Burley (2012). Believing in Reincarnation. Philosophy 87 (02):261-279.
Similar books and articles
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1976). The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
R. G. Swinburne (1973). Personal Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
Gary Foster (2011). Overcoming a Euthyphro Problem in Personal Love: Imagination and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):825 - 844.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 242.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #101,887 of 1,100,092 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #90,386 of 1,100,092 )
How can I increase my downloads?