Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism

Noûs 40 (2):205-240 (2006)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Disjunctivism  Epistemology  Externalism  Intentionalism  Internalism  Sensation
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00607.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
Ruth G. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 281--297.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.

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