David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kluwer Academic Publishers (1999)
One of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly `understanding' a referring act in communication. In this inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.
|Keywords||Reference (Linguistics Semantics Discourse analysis|
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|Call number||P325.5.R44.P38 1999|
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Joey Pollock (2015). Social Externalism and the Problem of Communication. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3229-3251.
Ray Buchanan (2013). Reference, Understanding, and Communication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-16.
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