Temporal Experience

Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359 (2010)
The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
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DOI jphil2010107727
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Barry Loewer (2012). Two Accounts of Laws and Time. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.

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