Tracking intentionalism and optimal conditions: A reply to Byrne and Tye
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In the mid-nineties, Fred Dretske, William Lycan and Michael Tye published books defending an ambitious new reductive program. The program came in two stages. The first was to defend Intentionalism. The second was to reduce the secondary qualities to external physical properties and then to explain sensory representation in terms of tracking under optimal conditions or biological function. The old reductive program was internalist: the idea used to be that we could reduce experiences to brain states. The new reductive program is externalist
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Tye (2003). On the Virtue of Being Poised: Reply to Seager. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):275-280.
Michael Tye (2003). Review: The Panic Theory: Reply to Byrne. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287 - 290.
Michael Tye (2003). The PANIC Theory: Reply to Byrne. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287-290.
Michael Pace (2007). Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.
Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
Adam Pautz (2010). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?