The relational structure of sensory consciousness and the mind-body problem
| Abstract | I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesBenny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Adam Pautz (2006). Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness. Noûs 39 (2):197 - 255.
Tim Crane (2000). The Origins of Qualia. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.
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