Variation in normal color vision and the nature of consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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It has been said that variation in normal color vision creates a problem for a certain theories of color. But there has been some controversy concerning the nature of the problem; indeed, it has been questioned whether there is even a problem at all. Here I do not use variation in normal color vision to develop a problem for any theory of color. Instead I use variation in normal color vision, together with certain natural assumptions, to develop a problem for reductive theories of our consciousness of colors. Elsewhere I have argued that hypothetical cases of biological variation in color vision create a problem for reductive theories of our consciousness of color. In the present paper, I argue that actual cases of standard variation create a quite different problem for such theories.
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