Why believe that experiences have contents?
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||I provide an argument from the best explanation for the claim that experiences have contents. In particular, I argue that a common factor account of experience in terms of content provides the best explanation of the fact that both veridical and non-veridical experience can ground the capacity for thought, of indeterminate and impossible experiences, and of other features of experience.|
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Similar books and articles
William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kent Baldner (1990). Is Transcendental Idealism Coherent? Synthese 85 (1):1 - 23.
Adam Pautz (2009). What Are the Contents of Experiences? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.
Michael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
Paul Coates (2009). The Multiple Contents of Experience. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):25-47.
Michael Tye (2005). On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
Michael J. Pendlebury (1990). Sense Experiences and Their Contents: A Defense of the Propositional Account. Inquiry 33 (2):215-30.
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Added to index2009-01-28
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