Being Known

Oxford University Press (1998)
Abstract
Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Metaphysics
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Reprint years 1999
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Call number BD161.P38 1999
ISBN(s) 0198238592   0198238606   9780198238591     9780198238607
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00167.x
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Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
Bence Nanay (2012). Action-Oriented Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.

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