Computation as involving content: A response to Egan

Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202 (1999)
Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states
Keywords Computation  Content  Metaphysics  Mind  Narrow  Egan, F
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