Motivated Irrationality

St. Augustine's Press (1984)
Abstract
This book is about self-deception and lack of self-control or wishful thinking and acting against one's own better judgement. Steering a course between the skepticism of philosophers, who find the conscious defiance of reason too paradoxical, and the tolerant empiricism of psychologists, it compares the two kinds of irrationality, and relates the conclusions drawn to the views of Freud, cognitive psychologists, and such philosophers as Aristotle, Anscombe, Hare and Davidson.
Keywords Irrationalism (Philosophy  Ethics
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Call number B824.2.P43 1998
ISBN(s) 1890318418  
DOI 10.2307/4106930
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Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2008). Finite Rational Self-Deceivers. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.

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