Motivated Irrationality

St. Augustine's Press (1984)
Abstract
This book is about self-deception and lack of self-control or wishful thinking and acting against one's own better judgement. Steering a course between the skepticism of philosophers, who find the conscious defiance of reason too paradoxical, and the tolerant empiricism of psychologists, it compares the two kinds of irrationality, and relates the conclusions drawn to the views of Freud, cognitive psychologists, and such philosophers as Aristotle, Anscombe, Hare and Davidson.
Keywords Irrationalism (Philosophy  Ethics
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Call number B824.2.P43 1998
ISBN(s) 1890318418
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Citations of this work BETA
Béatrice Han-Pile (2011). Nietzsche and Amor Fati. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):224-261.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Mark Rigstad, The 'Bush Doctrine' as a Hegemonic Discourse Strategy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

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