David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615 (2001)
This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, between content which is objective and content which is also conceived of by its subject as objective
|Keywords||Content Metaphysics Perception Phenomenology Kelly, S|
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John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
Philippe Chuard (2006). Demonstrative Concepts Without Reidentification. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
Monima Chadha (2009). Contents of Experience. Sophia 48 (3):237-251.
Michael Luntley (2010). Expectations Without Content. Mind and Language 25 (2):217-236.
Reid D. Blackman (2013). Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.
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