Phenomenology and nonconceptual content

This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, between content which is objective and content which is also conceived of by its subject as objective
Keywords Content  Metaphysics  Perception  Phenomenology  Kelly, S
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00077.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1998). Review: Reply to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):403 - 431.

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Citations of this work BETA
Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.

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