Rationale and maxims in the study of concepts

Noûs 39 (1):167-78 (2005)
Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
Keywords Composition  Concept  Individuation  Maxim  Metaphysics  Davis, W
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00498.x
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