David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24 (2008)
The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence or otherwise of sensational properties is pivotal in assessing functionalism, representationalism, and many other conceptions of mental states and the nature of our ability to think about them. Instead of engaging in extended sentence- by-sentence dissection of these many discussions, I hope that the theses I formulate will, taken together, comprise a positive conception of sensational properties that can be drawn upon in assessing those debates. My main aim is to articulate that conception.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
René Jagnow (2011). Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
Similar books and articles
Richard Swinburne (1993). Are Mental Events Identical with Brain Events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):173-181.
Evan Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Mental Imagery. Synthese 160 (3):203--213.
Richard J. Hall (2007). Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.
Aaron Ben-Ze[hamza ]ev (2003). Perceptual Objects May Have Nonphysical Properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.
Michael Huemer (2005). Logical Properties of Warrant. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171 - 182.
JeeLoo Liu (2007). Confucian Moral Realism. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):167 – 184.
John F. Post (1995). Review of Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations.
Mark DeBellis (1991). The Representational Content of Musical Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):303-24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads141 ( #13,124 of 1,724,892 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #59,662 of 1,724,892 )
How can I increase my downloads?