David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2004)
The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how these principles are realized in specific domains, Peacocke applies the theory in detail to several classical problems of philosophy, including the nature of perceptual entitlement, induction, and the status of moral thought. These discussions involve an elaboration of the structure of entitlement in ways that have applications in many other areas of philosophy. He also relates the theory to classical and recent rationalist thought, and to current issues in the theory of meaning, reference and explanation. In the course of these discussions, he proposes a general theory of the a priori. The focus of the work lies in the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and the theory of meaning, and will be of interest both to students and researchers in these areas, and to anyone concerned with the idea of rationality.
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|Call number||BD181.P425 2004|
|ISBN(s)||9780199270729 0199270732 0199270724 9780199270736|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378.
Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
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