Considerations on neo-Fregean ontology
| Abstract | i.e. for any concepts X and Y, the number of X’s and the number of Y’s are identical if and only if there is a 1-1 correspondence between X and Y.1 The central claim of neo- Fregeanism with respect to arithmetic is that arithmetical knowledge can be obtained a priori through Frege’s Theorem, the result that the axioms of arithmetic are derivable in the system obtained by adding Hume’s Principle to second-order logic. | |||||||||
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