David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 171 (3):443-457 (2009)
In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, secondly, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic reasons – and thus supports epistemic rationality – because, when P is an entitlement, trust in P is a dominant strategy with respect to promotion of epistemic value. The second line of response replaces dominance with maximization of expected utility. I argue that both of these proposals are flawed and develop an alternative line of response.
|Keywords||Epistemic entitlement Epistemic reasons Epistemic value Epistemic rationality Scepticism Crispin Wright|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969/1991). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Hilary Putnam (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press.
Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.
Duncan Pritchard (2012). Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Solving the Moorean Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
Giorgio Volpe (2012). Cornerstones: You'd Better Believe Them. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
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