David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 72 (3):588-607 (2012)
While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey of recent work on alethic pluralism—presenting various incarnations of the view, objections leveled against them, and various lines of response available to pluralists
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1998). Symposium: Realism and Truth. Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty, Minimalism. Mind 107 (425):157-181.
Douglas Edwards (2009). Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
C. Tappolet (2011). Truth as One and Many, by Michael P. Lynch. Mind 119 (476):1193-1198.
Crispin Wright (1998). Comrades Against Quietism: Reply to Simon Blackburn on Truth and Objectivity. Mind 107 (425):183-203.
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