Stabilizing alethic pluralism
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):92-108 (2010)
| Abstract | Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T 1 ... T n ). A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T 1 or ... or T n . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. The pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument. | |||||||||
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Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
Julian Dodd (forthcoming). Deflationism Trumps Pluralism! In Nikolaj Pedersen Cory Wright (ed.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. O.U.P..
Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Douglas Edwards (2008). How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
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