David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569 (2013)
William Alston has provided a by now well-known objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification by arguing that since we lack control over our beliefs, we are not responsible for them. It is widely acknowledged that if Alston’s argument is convincing, then it seems that the very idea of doxastic responsibility is in trouble. In this article, I attempt to refute one line of response to Alston’s argument. On this approach, we are responsible for our beliefs in virtue of the fact that we have certain belief-policies, that is, policies about what (not) to believe in certain circumstances. I present the advocate of this strategy with a dilemma: either belief-policies are themselves beliefs or they are not. If they are, then they are as involuntary as our other beliefs. If they are not, then they cannot make a difference to the beliefs we hold. I conclude that if we bear doxastic responsibility, it should not be explained in terms of our belief-policies
|Keywords||Belief-policies Belief Acceptance Ethics of belief|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
Matthew Chrisman (2008). Ought to Believe. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood (2009). Epistemic Norms Without Voluntary Control. Noûs 43 (4):599-632.
Murray Clarke (1986). Doxastic Voluntarism and Forced Belief. Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Helm (1994). Belief Policies. Cambridge University Press.
Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels (2010). Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Rik Peels (2013). Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise? Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.
Sergi Rosell (2009). A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism. Teorema (3):97-112.
Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer (2013). How We Choose Our Beliefs. Philosophia (1):1-13.
Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
Rik Peels & Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):75-88.
Danny Frederick (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Ronney Mourad (2008). Choosing to Believe. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):55 - 69.
Nathan Segars (2006). The Will and Evidence Toward Belief: A Critical Essay on Jonathan E. Adler's Belief's Own Ethics. Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.
Richard Amesbury (2008). The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):25 - 37.
Nikolaj Nottelmann (2006). The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559 - 582.
Matthias Steup (2011). Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality. Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Added to index2012-06-22
Total downloads79 ( #20,999 of 1,410,540 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #8,959 of 1,410,540 )
How can I increase my downloads?