David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Logos and Episteme 2 (4):575-582 (2011)
In this paper, I respond to the following argument which several authors have presented. If we are culpable for some action, we act either from akrasia or from culpable ignorance. However, akrasia is highly exceptional and it turns out that tracing culpable ignorance leads to a vicious regress. Hence, we are hardly ever culpable for our actions. I argue that the argument fails. Cases of akrasia may not be that rare when it comes to epistemic activities such as evidence gathering and working on our intellectual virtues and vices. Moreover, particular cases of akrasia may be rare, but they are not exceptional when we consider chains of actions. Finally and most importantly, we can be culpable for our actions even if we do not act from akrasia or from culpable ignorance, namely in virtue of our unactivated dispositional beliefs.
|Keywords||Culpable Ignorance akrasia|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
Christopher Michael Cloos (2015). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
Similar books and articles
Holly Smith (2011). Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.
Gideon Rosen (2002). Culpability and Ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61–84.
Alexander A. Guerrero (2007). Don't Know, Don't Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
Deborah Hellman (2009). Willfully Blind for Good Reason. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316.
James Montmarquet (1999). Zimmerman on Culpable Ignorance. Ethics 109 (4):842-845.
Holly Smith (1983). Culpable Ignorance. Philosophical Review 92 (4):543-571.
James A. Montmarquet (1995). Culpable Ignorance and Excuses. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):41-49.
Neil Levy (2009). Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick. Ethics 119 (4):729-741.
Alan Brudner (2009). Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice. Oxford University Press.
Nancy M. Williams (2008). Affected Ignorance and Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us at Moral Risk. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 21 (4):371-384.
Peter Vallentyne (2011). Enforcement Rights Against Non-Culpable Non-Just Intrusion. Ratio 24 (4):422-442.
Pierre Le Morvan (2011). On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels. Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.
Larry Alexander (2013). Causing the Conditions of One's Defense: A Theoretical Non-Problem. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (3):623-628.
Erinn Gilson (2011). Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression. Hypatia 26 (2):308-332.
Added to index2011-11-04
Total downloads229 ( #8,314 of 1,781,278 )
Recent downloads (6 months)77 ( #12,240 of 1,781,278 )
How can I increase my downloads?