What is ignorance?

Philosophia 38 (1):57-67 (2010)
Abstract
This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by paying attention to four philosophical problems in which ignorance plays a crucial role.
Keywords Ignorance  Lack of Knowledge  Lack of True Belief  Standard View  New View
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9202-8
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,651
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Lynch (2016). Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-05-11

Total downloads

135 ( #31,605 of 1,902,527 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #34,207 of 1,902,527 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.