Philosophia 38 (1):57-67 (2010)
|Abstract||This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by paying attention to four philosophical problems in which ignorance plays a crucial role.|
|Keywords||Ignorance Lack of Knowledge Lack of True Belief Standard View New View|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gideon Rosen (2002). Culpability and Ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61–84.
Pierre Le Morvan (2012). On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View. Philosophia 40 (2):379-393.
Rik Peels (2011). Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan. Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.
Rik Peels (2012). The New View on Ignorance Undefeated. Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Pierre le Morvan (2011). Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief. Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
Stuart Firestein (2012). Ignorance: How It Drives Science. Oxford University Press.
Erinn Gilson (2011). Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression. Hypatia 26 (2):308-332.
Danielle A. Layne (2009). In Praise of the Mere Presence of Ignorance. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:253-267.
Rik Peels (2011). Tracing Culpable Ignorance. Logos and Episteme 2 (4):575-582.
Pierre Le Morvan (2011). On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels. Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.
Added to index2009-05-11
Total downloads58 ( #20,276 of 722,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,055 of 722,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?