Why responsible belief is blameless belief

Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265 (2010)
What, according to proponents of doxastic deontologism, is responsible belief? In this paper, we examine two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a position we call DDP). We consider whether recent arguments in favor of DDP, mostly those recently offered by Brian Weatherson, stand up to scrutiny and argue that they do not. Given other considerations in favor of DDP, we conclude that the deontologist should maintain that doxastic responsibility is a concept about freedom from appropriate blame.
Keywords Responsible Belief  Blameless Belief  Praiseworthy Belief
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DOI jphil2010107519
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Christopher Michael Cloos (2015). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.

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