Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138 (2003)
|Abstract||In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action - 'reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set' - are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on the concept of desire-independent reasons, but rather on the concept of rational desire.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Dennis W. Stampe (1987). The Authority of Desire. Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality. Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.
Duncan MacIntosh (2001). Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Donald C. Hubin (1991). Irrational Desires. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
Joshua Gert (2002). Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95.
Neil Sinhababu (2011). The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
John R. Searle, Barry Smith, Leo Zaibert & Josef Moural (2001). Rationality in Action: A Symposium. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,682 of 722,783 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,783 )
How can I increase my downloads?