David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):305-322 (2003)
A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy.
|Keywords||EPR Kant's antinomies Newton's bucket thought experiments|
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Aviezer Tucker (2012). Nullius in Verba: Recent Studies in the Epistemology of Testimony. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (2):412-419.
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