David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796 (2013)
Safety is a notion familiar to epistemologists principally because of the way in which it has been used in the attempt to cast light on the nature of knowledge. In particular, some have argued that an important constraint on knowledge is that one knows p only if one believes p safely. In this paper, I use safety for a different purpose: to cast light on the nature of assertion. I introduce what I call the safety account of assertion, according to which one asserts p properly only if one asserts p safely. The central idea is that an assertion’s propriety depends on whether one could easily have asserted falsely in a similar case. I argue that the safety account is well motivated, since it neatly explains our intuitions about a wide range of assertions of different kinds. Of particular interest is the fact that the account explains our intuitions about several kinds of assertions which appear to raise problems for well-known rival accounts
|Keywords||Assertion Knowledge Safety Norm|
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Lackey (2008). Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Citations of this work BETA
Charlie Pelling (2013). Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-14.
Geoff Pynn (2014). Assertibility and Sensitivity. Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.
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