Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability

Synthese 164 (2):289 - 312 (2008)
 I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactly—but which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way
Keywords Exact  Inexact  Non-transitive  Indiscriminability
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9227-0
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.

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