Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information (much less non-physical facts), and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound|
|Keywords||Information Knowledge Metaphysics Physicalism Truth|
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