Enlightening the fully informed

Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56 (2005)
This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information , and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound
Keywords Information  Knowledge  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7794-1
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Earl Conee (1994). Phenomenal Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.

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