Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63 (2010)
|Abstract||It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a primitive feature of experience, or else as something analyzable into wholly non-phenomenal terms.|
|Keywords||phenomenal temporality idealism stream of consciousness|
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