On an argument for functional invariance

Minds and Machines 18 (3):373-377 (2008)
The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience
Keywords functionalism  naturalistic dualism  organizational invariance
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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